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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we develop a dynamic regional computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for Guatemala 
that incorporates regional disaggregated sectors for agriculture. The model is designed to be useful as a 
development tool for determining the effects of regional investments intended to reduce regional poverty 
and also to explore policy options to deal with a number of macro and balance-of-payments issues. Our 
model extends previous modeling work on Guatemala in several ways. First, it develops an updated 
regional social accounting matrix (SAM) for 2008, coupled with an updated CGE. Second, the CGE is a 
recursive dynamic model that incorporates unemployment in the short run. Most CGE models are not 
useful for short-run analysis because they are comparative static models that assume full employment. We 
specify a fixed minimum wage and an informal sector and use a recursive dynamic framework to solve 
for the short-run adjustment process that occurs as the economy responds to shocks. Second, the model is 
regional, permitting us to examine the impact of sectoral development policies, particularly those focused 
on agriculture. 
Guatemala has one of the lowest investment rates in Latin America.  We show that if the 
investment share is raised by 4percent over five years, the rate of growth of the economy rises by about .6 
percentage points.  Guatemala is also quite sensitive to external macro disturbances.  Our dynamic model 
gives a first approximation of the timing and nature of the adjustment over the ten years following various 
macro disturbances.  We show that after ten years most of these shocks are absorbed by changes in the 
real exchange rate and the composition of output rather than the rate of growth of output.  Negative 
shocks cause a real devaluation and a shift from consumption and non-tradables and towards exports and 
tradable goods.  An important empirical question is whether the adjustment toward the traded goods 
sector is as flexible as the underlying elasticities in the model imply.   
Keywords:  General Equilibrium Models, Guatemala, economic development, regional CGE model, 
macro shocks  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we develop a dynamic regional computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for Guatemala 
that incorporates regional disaggregated sectors for agriculture. The model is designed to be useful as a 
development tool for determining the effects of regional investments intended to reduce regional poverty, 
particularly in the North and West, and also to explore policy options to deal with a number of macro and 
balance-of-payments issues. Our model extends previous modeling work on Guatemala in several ways. 
First, it develops an updated regional social accounting matrix (SAM) for 2008, coupled with an updated 
CGE. Second, the CGE is a recursive dynamic model that incorporates unemployment in the short run. 
Most CGE models are not useful for short-run analysis because they are comparative, static models that 
assume full employment. We specify a fixed minimum wage and an informal sector, and we use a 
recursive dynamic framework to solve for the short-run adjustment process that occurs as the economy 
responds to shocks. We also use the dynamic model to address a number of growth questions. Finally, the 
model is regional, permitting us to examine the impact of sectoral development policies, particularly those 
focused on agriculture.  
The paper starts with a brief overview of the macro performance of the country, including some 
evidence bearing on the factors that can help explain the growth slowdown. In Section 2 we present a 
short description of the regional CGE model and its key characteristics. In Section 3 we look at the effects 
of investment on gross domestic product (GDP) and then show the sensitivity of the economy to balance-
of-payments shocks, including the impact of several macro shocks that have hit the economy in recent 
years: first, variations in the inflow of remittances and direct foreign investment; second, a rise in the 
international price of food; and finally, a rise in the price of oil. In Section 4 we simulate several 
alternative investment strategies aimed either at expanding exports or at improving the productivity of 
agriculture, particularly in the poorer areas of the country. Section 5 concludes. 
Guatemala’s Challenging Macroeconomic Environment  
Growth in Guatemala since the turn of the millennium has been lackluster, far worse than what the 
economy achieved before 1980. Between 1960 and 1981, the average annual growth rate of per capita 
income was 2.6 percent. Then the country went through two decades of steep recession and civil war, 
from which it had only partially recovered by the year 2000. From 2006 to 2008, with large inflows of 
remittances and buoyant export markets, the country finally seemed to have overcome a long 25-year 
period of stagnation and was growing faster than at any time since the mid-1970s. All this came to a 
sudden halt due to both the current political crisis and the downturn in the United States, which shrank 
both remittances and exports. As a result, over the entire 9 years since the turn of the millennium, per 
capita income has grown by only 0.5 percent per year.  
To make matters worse, poverty rates in Guatemala are among the highest in Latin America, and 
such growth as there has been has not done much to alleviate it. According to the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), in 2006, 55 percent of the entire 
Guatemalan population had an income of less than the poverty line, a situation only marginally changed 
over the previous decade. This is not particularly surprising, given the slow growth rate of per capita 
income. But the picture is particularly serious in the rural sector, where two-thirds of the population is 
poor, and 42 percent are extremely poor. Because of the relatively low level of urbanization in the country 
these figures imply that two-thirds of all poor people and three-fourths of extremely poor people live in 
the countryside. What is as worrisome as this pattern is the fact that since 2002, virtually all the progress 
in poverty reduction that has occurred has taken place in the urban sector. Rural poverty indexes barely 
moved between 2002 and 2006. If Guatemala is going to make significant progress in poverty reduction, 
it will have to raise its overall growth rate and also confront the rural poverty problem. These are the two 
problems to which this paper is addressed.  
Figure 1.1 shows Guatemala’s annual growth rate of GDP per capita in a time path between 1960 
and 2009. What is quite clear is the deterioration in growth performance since 1980. In the 21 years prior  
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to 1980, there were 7 consecutive years when the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita exceeded 
3.5 percent; in only a single year was there negative growth. Since 1980, there have been no comparable 
periods of rapid sustained growth; moreover, in 10 years the growth was negative.  
Figure 1.1—Growth rate of GDP per capita, 1960–2009 
 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
The main points to be drawn from Figure 1.1 are the good performance of the Guatemalan 
economy from 1960 to 1980, the sharp contraction through 1986, the slow recovery through the 1990s, a 
new recession from 2001 to 2003, accelerating recovery through 2007, and then a new recession in 
2008/09. The economy grew rapidly before 1980, but then stagnated in the 1980s and 1990s. Because of 
the stop-and-go nature of the recovery after 1986, it took 25 years for Guatemala to surpass the per capita 
income it had in the peak year, 1980. To show this pattern more formally, we ran two regressions of per 
capita GDP in constant local currency units on a time trend. The first regression covered the period 1960–
1980 and the second, 1980–2009. According to the regressions, the average rate of growth of GDP per 
capita over the period 1960–1980 was 2.9 percent, one of the highest rates in Latin America. But after 
1980, the growth rate slowed to only 0.7 percent. This result leads us to ask two questions. First, what 
happened after 1980 to the relatively dynamic Guatemalan economy of the 1960s and 1970s? Second, can 
the economy again reach the growth rate that it produced before the recession of the last two years?  
To better understand the change in growth performance after 1980, consider the changes in the 
composition of GDP as well as the average growth rate of its different components, shown in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1—Growth rates of components of GDP in different time periods 
   Average growth rates     Average shares  
  1960-1981  1981-2000  2000-2008    1960-1981  1981-2000  2000-2008 
Government  0.0524  0.0387  0.0143    7.23  6.68  8.27 
Investment  0.0632  0.0250  0.0731    14.42  14.50  20.50 
Exports  0.0635  0.0313  0.0313    18.20  16.99  24.71 
Imports  0.0458  0.0394  0.0499    20.43  22.25  39.45 
Consumption  0.0485  0.0272  0.0381    80.58  84.08  85.98 
GDP   0.0534  0.0258  0.0376    100  100  100 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
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In the period before 1980, growth was led by exports and investment. Although the country ran a 
small trade deficit, the rate of growth of exports exceeded that of imports by a comfortable margin. 
Household consumption grew, but at a slower rate than GDP. This implies that domestic saving financed 
a significant share of capital formation. The period after 2000 was completely different. Investment still 
expanded, but the real contrast is in the behavior of exports, imports, and household consumption. 
Exports were no longer the engine of growth they had been prior to 1980. Household consumption now 
played that role. Capital formation increased, but to a large extent that was financed by either capital 
inflows or remittances. The large increase in imports and in the trade deficit starting in the 1990s and 
accelerating after 2000 reflects trade liberalization after 1990, the rise of consumption, and the increasing 
role of remittances in the economy.  
Guatemala is an extremely open economy. When and if the economy grows rapidly, there is also 
an  increase in the demand for imports. Prior to 1980, that required a corresponding increase in exports. 
That is not the case now.  Currently those imports can be financed by remittances. Remittances increase 
aggregate demand, which generally causes a rise in imports and an appreciation of the exchange rate, 
which in turn shifts production away from traded goods, such as agriculture and manufactures, and 
toward nontraded service activities and imports. In the period after 1980, the increased foreign exchange 
from remittances enabled households to buy more foreign goods without generating as much domestic 
production or employment as would have been necessary had that consumption been financed by exports. 
As a result, even though investment increased to the highest shares ever observed in Guatemala, the 
growth rate of domestic production did not reflect that. We will examine the role of remittances in the 
growth process using a dynamic CGE model later in the paper. 
Investment and Growth 
Development economists and supply-side theorists emphasize the importance of fixed capital formation 
as a driver of economic growth. It contributes in two ways: first by increasing the capital available per 
worker, thus increasing worker productivity; and second by allowing investment in new, more productive 
machinery, thus raising total productivity as well. One would therefore expect that increasing the 
investment share would lead to faster growth rates. Generally economies that do not save and invest do 
not grow rapidly. But the relationship between investment and growth in Guatemala is ambiguous. Figure 
1.2 confirms the positive relationship between investment and growth in the pre-1980 period, but not 
afterwards. Investment fell in the 1980s, along with GDP, but then it recovered quite strongly after 1990. 
The investment share in Guatemala averaged more than 20 percent after year 2000, a rate that should have 
increased the growth rate of the economy. But it did not, at least not until 2006. Generally speaking, it 
does not look like investment leads to growth in Guatemala.  
The investment share is plotted against the growth rate of per capita income in Figure 1.2. 
Relatively low investment shares in the pre-1980 period were associated with relatively high growth rates, 
whereas much higher rates of investment in later years were coupled with very low or even negative 
growth rates in the economy. That is undoubtedly because the debt crisis of those years forced a retraction 
in demand so that the increases in potential output or capacity made possible by higher levels of 
investment were not matched by higher levels of demand. But it is somewhat surprising to find that the 
acceleration of investment after 2000 was not matched by higher growth rates.   
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Figure 1.2—Investment and growth 
 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
The Shrinking Contribution of Productivity Growth Since 1980 
Recent research on economic growth has increasingly focused on the role of knowledge and rising 
productivity as key determinants of growth. This is not to deny the important roles played by capital and 
labor, but simply to acknowledge the apparent fact that over long periods of time, for many countries, 
rising productivity accounts for close to half of observed growth. It is therefore a natural question to ask 
what role rising productivity has had in the growth in Guatemala and whether it has changed over time. 
And the clear answer from our research is that there has been a sharp reduction in productivity growth in 
Guatemala since 1980, similar to that of almost all the countries of the region.
1 For the lost decade of the 
1980s, that is easy to understand. As previously mentioned, most countries endured painful recessions 
during that decade, so one would expect that actual output levels would be far below the potential output 
implied by their capital stocks and labor force. That explanation might even apply to the 1990s, given the 
very slow recovery that most countries had from the lost decade. But if our research is correct, very low 
productivity growth rates in Guatemala have continued after the turn of the millennium. That has serious 
implications for growth.  
Here is how we have come to this conclusion. There is no direct way to measure productivity and 
therefore no way to definitively say what happened to productivity. However, we can use the Solow 
growth model to get a pretty good first approximation. Assuming a Cobb–Douglas production function, 
the growth rate of productivity is equal to the difference between the growth rate of GDP and the 
weighted growth rates of capital and labor, where the weights are equal to the shares of capital and labor 
in national income.  
To make this operational, there are two questions we have to address. Since actual GDP 
fluctuates, we are going to want to measure the growth rate of GDP between points when GDP is at or 
near its potential, so the first question is where these points are. For Guatemala, output peaked in 1981, 
which makes that year the natural endpoint of the period starting in 1960. Output fell during the recession 
of the early 1980s and then grew, either more or less slowly, until a peak in 2009. Thus our second period 
should run from 1981 to 2009. 
The second question is how to measure the factor growth rates themselves. We can approximate 
the growth rate of the labor force by using the growth rate of the working-age population. The growth rate 
of capital is more difficult, simply because national accounts do not contain that information. However, 
                                                       
1 See Morley (2010) for evidence on other countries in Latin America. 
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we can use the fact that although we do not know the capital stock, we do know gross fixed investment. 
Therefore if we go back far enough in the past, and if we can assume a fixed rate of depreciation, we can 
get a pretty good approximation of what the capital stock must have been at other times, once we set the 
initial capital stock at some number. It is easy to see that given a long enough time period, the final level 
of capital will be quite insensitive to the level at which we set the initial capital stock simply because, 
given enough time, that initial capital stock will have been depreciated away. We are going to start our 
capital stock–building exercise in 1960, assuming that the capital-to-output ratio was 3 in that year. We 
also assume a depreciation rate of 5 percent. That will imply that just maintaining the capital stock will 
require fixed investment equal to 15 percent of GDP. Once we have built up a capital stock using these 
assumptions, we can then calculate its growth rate between the years when GDP reached an intermediate 
peak. The growth rate of productivity will then be the observed growth rate of GDP between the peak 
years, less the growth rate of our estimated capital stock between those same years, less the growth rate of 
the population, the latter two weighted by the shares of each factor in GDP.
2 The results of all this are 
displayed in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2—Productivity in Guatemala, 1960–2009 
  Growth rates 
  1960-1981  1981-2009 
Working age population   0.02658  0.02568 
Capital stock  0.03451  0.03007 
GDP (constant LCU)  0.05338  0.02842 
Productivity  2.30%  0.10% 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
To summarize all this growth evidence, up to 1980 capacity and actual output grew more or less 
in tandem. More to the point, good growth rates were achieved with a relatively low rate of investment in 
the economy, thanks to significant increases in total factor productivity. The situation seems to be 
completely different after 1980. Guatemala, like all the other countries in the region, had a recession in 
the early 1980s. Although it subsequently recovered, it reached its potential output level only in 2009. 
Before 1980 Guatemala got a significant growth boost from productivity. Afterwards, potential output 
continued to grow, but only because of a large increase in capital formation. In effect, Guatemala was 
investing more but getting a lot less growth for that effort. Rising remittances and capital inflows assured 
that there was no balance-of-payments constraint. On the contrary, there was an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. None of this produced a return to the growth rates of 1960–1980.  
   
                                                       
2 We get the factor shares from our SAM.   
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2.  THE MODEL  
We built a national SAM for 2008, which extended previous work in three directions. First, we 
regionalized the SAM, using information from a recent agricultural census.
3 Second, we put land into the 
matrix, which permitted us to tie production in agriculture to each of the four regions in the SAM. Third, 
we regionalized household income in order to show the regional impact of each of the external shocks or 
increases in productivity that we simulated.  
The SAM is disaggregated into the 61 sectors shown in Table A.1 in the appendix and into the 
four regions defined in footnote 3. We report data separately for labor by region, divided into skilled and 
unskilled, formal and informal; for land by region; and for capital. Tab le 2.1 displays the macro SAM 
that results from aggregating all the columns and rows of the full regionalized SAM.
4  
It is important to note that in the regional SAM for all the agricultural sectors, there are regional 
activities producing the same commodity. These agricultural activities are disaggregated by the four 
regions and then combined into one national commodity (Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1—Regional aggregation for Guatemala 
 
Source: Authors. 
Notes: We aggregated the data by department into four regions: North (departments of Baja Verapaz, Alta Verapaz, and Petén), 
Central (Metropolitana, Sacatepéquez, Chimaltenango, and Escuintla), West (Sololá, Totonicapán, Quetzaltenango, 
Suchitepéquez, Retalhuleu, San Marcos, Huehuetenango, and Quiché), and East (El Progreso, Izabal, Zacapa, Chiquimula, Santa 
Rosa, Jalapa, Jutiapa). 
                                                       
3  Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Alimentación. 2011. El agro en cifras, fichas. 
http://portal.maga.gob.gt/portal/page/portal/uc_upie/fichas.  
4 The full SAM can be requested by email from v.pineiro@cgiar.org.  
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Table 2.1—2008 Macro SAM for Guatemala, in millions of GTQ (Guatemalan quetzales)  
 
Activities  Commodities 
Transport 
Costs  Labor  Capital  Land  Households  Government  Import Tax 
Activities    470.13               
Commodities  193.02    70.95        259.41  32.23   
Transport Costs    70.95               
Labor  113.83                 
Capital  153.47                 
Land  8.37                 
Households        113.83  153.47  8.37    6.65   
Government                  2.41 
Import Tax    2.41               
Value Added Tax    19.36               
Direct Tax              11.92     
Subsidies    -1.054               
Activity Tax  1.442                 
Change Stocks                   
Saving 
Investments 
            38.41  -3.93   
Rest of World    113.61          11.26  -0.87   
 
  Value Added 






World  Total 
Activities                470.13 
Commodities          -4.53  52.21  72.11  675.41 
Transport Costs                70.95 
Labor                113.83 
Capital                153.47 
Land                8.37 
Households              38.69  321.00 
Government  19.36  11.92  -1.05  1.44        34.08 
Import Tax                2.414 
Value Added Tax                19.36 
Direct Tax                11.92 
Subsidies                -1.05 
Activity Tax                1.44 
Change Stocks            -4.53    -4.53 
Saving 
Investments 
            13.20  47.68 
Rest of World                124.00 
Source: Authors’ worksheets.  
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Components of the Model 
The regional CGE model used in this part of the research is based on the standard model used by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (see Lofgren et al. 2001), which follows the 
neoclassical–structuralist tradition originally presented by Dervis et al (1982), with some modifications 
needed to capture the multimarket aspect of the agricultural sector included in this work. The advantage 
of the regionalized model is that it links decisions made at the national level with outcomes on poverty, 
employment, and production across regions. That permits us to examine policies intended to improve the 
regional distribution of activities and income in a consistent general equilibrium fashion, which 
incorporates national macro fiscal and monetary constraints. This advance is made possible by the 
availability of regional information from the recent agricultural census. 
The CGE model has three components. The first shows the payments that are registered in the 
SAM, following the same disaggregation of factors, activities, commodities, and institutions shown in the 
matrix. The second is the equations that represent the behavior of the different institutions present. The 
third is the constraints that have to be satisfied by the whole system covering the factor and goods 
markets, the balances for savings and investment, the government, and the current account of the rest of 
the world.  
Each producer maximizes profits under constant returns on scale and perfect competition. There 
are three factors of production: labor (differentiated by skill and region), land (differentiated by region), 
and capital. Production is related to factor inputs in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production 
function, which allows producers to substitute these three inputs until they reach the point where the 
marginal revenue of each factor equals the factor price (wage or rent). The second choice producers make 
is the amount of intermediate inputs they will use. This specification is made assuming fixed shares that 
specify the appropriate amount of intermediate inputs per unit of output and of labor or capital (value-
added). Finally, output prices depend on the value-added (cost of labor, land and capital), the intermediate 
inputs, and any relevant taxes and subsidies. 
Figure 2.2 shows the flow of a single commodity from producers to final demand. First, there is 
the combination of goods from all producers into an aggregate commodity output. This is achieved using 
a CES product demand system with the intention of leaving the option to the buyers as to how much to 
buy of each individual product (maximizing their consumption). The aggregate output is sold 
domestically or internationally. The producers’ allocation between domestic sales and exports is specified 
via a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function, assuming imperfect transformability between 
exports and domestic sales. The producers will sell their products to the market with the highest 
profitability. The domestic price is the international price times the exchange rate plus any possible export 
taxes or export subsidies. The domestic good is combined with imports to produce the composite 
commodity. For this the Armington (1969) specification is used, which means that the domestically 
produced and imported goods are imperfect substitutes.  
Figure 2.2—Flow of goods from producers to the national composite commodity 
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Consumption  Imports 
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In this model there are three institutions—households, government, and the rest of the world—
which do three things—produce, consume, and accumulate capital. Households save a constant fraction of 
their disposable income and buy consumption goods with the remainder. Household income is the sum of 
salaries, profits, and government and rest-of-the-world transfers. Household consumption of goods and 
services is determined by a linear expenditure system (LES). Government receives taxes, consumes goods 
and services, and makes transfers to households. The capital account collects the savings from the 
households, government, and rest of the world, and it and buys capital goods (investment).  
As was mentioned in the previous section, our CGE model contains detailed information on the 
demand and supply of 61 economic sectors and commodities, with 97 correspondent activities (including 
12 agricultural activities further disaggregated by 4 regions). 
Labor is disaggregated by qualification (skilled and unskilled), by sector (formal and informal), 
and by region. Workers within each region can migrate between sectors and across regions according to 
labor demand, but total labor supply grows at a constant rate of 2 percent per year. Land is disaggregated 
by region and is region-specific. This is one of the elements that drives the regional production results. 
The other feature of our treatment of labor is the supply curve for unskilled labor in the formal sector. For 
this factor we assume a fixed minimum wage and assume that there is an excess supply of unskilled labor, 
at least over the range of solutions that we analyze. Effectively that means that the supply curve of labor 
is flat, or in other words that the wage is fixed and employment is endogenous. But since the entire model 
is a real model, or is expressed in terms of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) numeraire, that means that the 
wage of unskilled labor is fixed in real terms.  
Household income and expenditure patterns vary across regions. This is important, since the 
incomes earned by workers in different sectors will benefit different households, depending on their 
location and factor endowments. These representative households receive factor incomes and per capita 
transfers from the national government. Households save some of their incomes and use their remaining 
income to consume goods under an LES of demand. All commodity markets are national, so prices in all 
commodity markets differ only in the transportation costs.  
The Dynamic Version of the Model 
We developed a recursive dynamic CGE model for this study. The model is solved in two stages. The first 
stage aims to find a solution for a one-year equilibrium using a static CGE model. In the second stage, a 
model between periods is used to create the dynamic linkages that update the variables that drive growth. 
The intertemporal equations provide values for all exogenous variables needed for the next period by the 
static CGE model, which is then solved for a new equilibrium. The model is solved forward in a 
dynamically recursive fashion, with each static solution depending only on current and past variables. The 
model does not incorporate future expectations; instead, the behavior of its agents is based on adaptive 
expectations, since the model is solved one period at a time. The variables and parameters used as 
linkages between periods are the aggregate capital stock (which is updated endogenously, given previous 
investment and depreciation), the population, the domestic labor force, factor productivity, export and 
import prices, export demand, tariff rates, and transfers to and from the rest of the world (all of which are 
modified exogenously).
5  
The allocation of new capital across sectors is done by adjusting the proportion of each sector’s 
share in aggregate investment as a function of the relative profit rate of each sector compared with the 
average profit rate of the economy as a whole. Sectors with higher average profit rates will get higher 
shares of the available investment, and those with lower rates will get lower shares. Over time, sector 
profit rates should converge.  
We assumed that the labor force grows by 2 percent per year, and we add those additional 
workers to the supply of skilled labor or to the surplus of unskilled labor. The growth of capital is 
                                                       
5 The dynamic model used in this research follows the models developed by IFPRI (Lofgren, Harris, and Robinson 2001; 
Thurlow 2004).  
10 
determined by the amount of investment, net of depreciation. We also update the rate of disembodied 
technical change by 1 percent per year, or by a different amount when we do simulated technical change 
experiments. We can then vary the exogenous rates of savings, taxes, and each of the other policy 
parameters in the model over time to determine the effects of these changes on the rate of growth of the 
economy.  
As mentioned before, growth in the labor force by skill class is exogenous and related to 
population growth, which in turn is based on population growth projections taken from national data. For 
unskilled labor, the total size of the available labor force does not affect the solution in any period 
because in the simulations we assume that there is an excess or a backlog of unemployed labor, which is 
not absorbed before the end of our simulations.  
The simulations run with the model for Guatemala give us the growth path for the economy for 
10 years under a number of different policy alternatives. These paths are compared with the one obtained 
using the base simulation (in which no exogenous policy changes are included) to see the impacts of 
implementing various different total factor productivity (TFP) scenarios combined with new investment.  
To summarize, the dynamic accumulation process is 
1.  updated by exogenous trends (labor force growth, productivity changes, capital stock 
growth, and population growth), 
2.  updated by economic behavior (distribution of investment by sector, distribution of 
labor force by sector and category), and 
3.  updated by implemented policies (changes in remittances, in international prices, and in 
TFP accompanied with investment). 
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3.  THE MACRO SIMULATIONS 
The first simulation shows the effect on the growth rate of increasing the rate of capital formation. In the 
base year, the investment rate is only 18- percent. Given that the capital output ratio is around 3 and the 
depreciation rate 5 percent per year, this investment rate barely permits any increase in capital intensity. 
In the base year simulation, we hold the investment share of GDP roughly constant. Given the assumed 1 
percent increase in productivity and 2 percent increase in the labor force, the base run gives a GDP 
growth rate of 4.1 percent per year. Note that this base simulation is somewhat arbitrary because it 
depends on the capital-to-output ratio that we chose for the model. Since we fix the amount of gross 
additions to the capital stock in the model, the higher the capital output ratio we choose, the slower the 
base growth rate will be. For the simulations reported in this paper, we choose a capital output ratio of 4, 
which gives a base growth rate of 4.1 percent per year. What is critical for the model is that alternative 
simulations are not particularly sensitive to the capital-to-output ratio we choose. If that is the case, 
deviations across simulations of the growth rate from the base growth rate will be informative and 
significant. In other words, what we should and will focus on is changes in growth rates across 
simulations, not the growth rate itself.  
Investment Rate 
In our first simulation we ask what happens if Guatemala increases its investment rate. In Figure 3.1 we 
show how the growth rate of the economy varies with the growth rate of investment. In the base run, the 
investment share starts at 18 percent and shrinks slightly. That rate produces a growth rate of 4.1 percent 
per year. If Guatemala is able to raise the growth rate of investment to 5 percent per year, the growth rate 
of the economy rises to 4.4 percent per year, and by year 10 the investment share rises to 19 percent. If 
the growth rate of investment rises to 7 percent, the investment share rises to 22 percent by year 10, and 
the growth rate of the economy rises to 4.75 percent. In other words, the economy gets an increase of two-
thirds of a percentage point in its growth rate for each additional 4 percentage points that it devotes to 
capital formation. If in addition we suppose that the rate of technical change is related to increases in 
capital, then the growth-enhancing impact of capital formation would be enhanced in roughly the same 
proportion.  
Figure 3.1—Investment share and growth 
 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 




















Obviously if there is no additional external financing available for such an effort, there is a 
significant short-run cost to consumption of households and perhaps also of the government. In the base 
run, consumption rises a bit more slowly than GDP because exports have to grow enough to finance 
necessary imports. If the investment share increases by 4 percentage points (grows by 7 percent per year), 
household consumption shrinks in absolute amount by about 1 percent to make room for this additional 
investment. Government spending is assumed to fall by about 4 percent. But then consumption begins to 
grow at the faster rate (3.9 percent) made possible by the additional capital. Somewhere between years 6 
and 7, consumption along the new, higher growth path overtakes that of the base run. After that, 
households enjoy both a higher level and a faster growth rate of their consumption. , essentially depicting 
the tradeoff between consumption now and later. If the country is unable to borrow to finance the increase 
in investment, then the society sets aside a part of its consumption now in order to have more later.  
Table 3.1 gives an idea of how the economy produces the additional investment required to raise 
the growth rate. It shows the percent changes from the base under our three simulated increases in the 
investment growth rates. The growth of both GDP and absorption increases, but most of that increase has 
to go into investment. Consumption has to decline, as we have seen, but in addition there has to be an 
increase in exports because investment is more import-intensive than is either government or private 
consumption. Thus if the economy is going to increase capital formation, it will require more 
complementary imports. But since foreign saving and remittances are both assumed to be constant, which 
requires additional exports. That in turn requires a real devaluation. As can be seen in the table, in order to 
raise the investment growth rate to 7 percent, for example, there has to be a real devaluation of almost 3 
percent above the base. That real devaluation chokes off some of the imports that would otherwise enter 
the economy during the rise in investment, and it also is an incentive to increase exports by just enough to 
keep foreign saving constant.  
Table 3.1—Effects of changes in investment on growth rates of macro variables 
  Initial  Base  Inv +5%  Inv +6%  Inv +7%  Inv +10% 
Absorption 
328.74  3.55  3.80  3.94  4.08  4.23 
Consumption 
256.49  3.57  3.84  3.80  3.75  3.68 
Investment 
49.99  3.20  5.00  6.00  7.00  8.00 
Stocks 
-4.56            
Government 
26.83  3.47  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Exports 
71.22  5.62  6.34  6.64  6.94  7.25 
Imports 
-124.97  3.49  3.98  4.18  4.39  4.61 
GDP at market prices 
274.99  4.14  4.43  4.59  4.75  4.91 
Real exchange rate 
100.00  6.10  7.50  8.20  8.80  9.50 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
Macro Shocks 
We now look at three one-time macro shocks to an exogenous variable—first a fall in remittances, second 
a rise in the international price of food, and third a rise in the price of imported oil—tracing the first 10 
period reactions to the shock. We consider first the impact of a change in remittances (see Table 3.2). 
Remittances are a crucial component for all the Central American economies. In the base scenario for 
Guatemala, they make up 12 percent of household income and are half the size of total exports. They are 
far larger than net foreign saving since a larger part of them goes to finance household consumption than 
is used for investment. In the simulations reported here, we assume that the change in remittances 
represents at the same time an equivalent change in the supply of foreign saving. Lowering remittances by  
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10 percent reduces the supply of U.S. dollars both to households and to foreign exchange markets by the 
same absolute amount. Table 3.2 shows how various changes in remittances affect the economy. The 
table shows the effects of the changes in the inflow of remittances on the 10-year growth rates in our 
dynamic simulation. In column 1 we reduce remittances by 10 percent, in column 2 we raise them by 10 
percent, and in column 3 we raise them by 20 percent.  
Table 3.2—Growth rates of macro variables with different remittance levels 
    Base  -10%  +10%  +20% 
Real  Absorption 
3.55  3.22  3.87  4.18 
   Consumption 
3.57  3.24  3.89  4.20 
   Investment 
3.20  2.85  3.54  3.87 
   Government consumption 
3.47  3.22  3.70  3.92 
   Exports 
5.62  6.03  5.20  4.79 
   Imports 
3.49  3.17  3.82  4.14 
   GDP at market prices 
4.14  4.03  4.25  4.36 
              
Prices  Real exchange rate 
6.10  8.10  4.20  2.30 
   Nominal exchange rate 
5.00  6.70  3.40  1.80 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
Remittances have a powerful effect on both the overall growth rate of the economy and its 
composition, especially the latter. When there is a reduction in the supply of remittances, the real 
exchange rate depreciates and the growth rate of GDP declines, but by less than the decline in 
consumption, investment, or absorption. These three all fall by around .3 percent, compared with .1 
percent for the GDP growth rate. The reason is that the reduction in foreign saving from a smaller inflow 
of remittances has to be made up by either more exports or fewer imports. As a result, when remittances 
decline the export growth rate increases and the import growth rate declines, all of which at least partially 
offsets the reduction in foreign exchange.  
Consider now the sectoral impact of changes in remittances. To make the patterns easier to see, in 
Table 3.3 we aggregate the information into four broad sectors. We find, as expected, that rising 
remittances are negatively related to both agricultural and manufacturing exports and positively related to 
imports in those same two sectors. But that is not true for total output. As the table demonstrates, both 
agricultural and manufactured output rise with remittances despite the fact that exports from the two 
sectors go down and imports go up at the same time. That is because the rise in remittances allows such a 
large rise in household consumption that this more than offsets the small reduction in exports and the rise 
in imports. In other words, while raising the inflow of remittances hurts producers as exporters, they come 
out ahead as producers thanks to the big rise in domestic demand.  
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Table 3.3—Change over 10 years in value-added, exports, and imports 
   Value Added 
   Agricultural  Manufacture  Construction  Services 
Base 
10.88  31.65  5.63  64.81 
Remit-10 
10.65  32.03  5.06  62.23 
Remit+10 
11.09  31.30  6.20  67.34 
Remit+20 




3.64  30.64  0.23  10.75 
Remit-10 
4.04  33.36  0.26  11.78 
Remit+10 
3.23  28.03  0.21  9.74 
Remit+20 




1.58  37.10  0.00  1.34 
Remit-10 
1.40  33.53  -0.01  0.94 
Remit+10 
1.77  40.76  0.01  1.77 
Remit+20 
1.96  44.50  0.02  2.23 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
Remittances clearly have a large impact on trade and the structure of production. They permit the 
substitution of imports for the domestic production of tradables, and they reduce the need to produce 
foreign exchange by exporting. Thus, when we reduce remittances by 10 percent, exports of manufactures 
rise, imports fall, and manufactured value-added rises slightly. At the same time, value-added falls in the 
two main nontraded goods sectors, construction and services.
6 Agriculture is a mixed sector because it 
depends heavily on imported inputs, particularly fuel and fertilizer. So while the rise in the real exchange 
rate in response to a reduction in remittances helps exporters as sellers, it hurts them as buyers of 
necessary inputs. The same phenomenon applies to manufacturing. The real exchange rate is a double-
edged sword. Real devaluation helps all producers of tradables as sellers, but at the same time it raises 
their costs. This dependence on imported intermediate inputs, particularly of petroleum, makes output in 
Guatemala quite insensitive to even fairly large changes in the real exchange rate.  
In the next set of simulations we first raise prices of Guatemala’s traditional exports—coffee, 
bananas, and cardamom—as well as sugar and grain, and then raise the price of imported oil. Not 
surprisingly, on balance the food price shocks are positive for Guatemala and the oil price shock is 
negative. They have similar and offsetting effects on the terms of trade, but the magnitude of their effects 
on exports, real exchange rate, production, and absorption are quite different. Consider first the food price 
shock, shown in Table 3.4. Raising food prices by 30 percent improves the terms of trade by 4 percent 
and permits an increase in absorption, investment, and consumption. There is also an appreciation of the 
exchange rate, a fall in total export growth, and a rise in imports. What is surprising is that this favorable 
terms-of-trade effect has very little effect on the growth rate of GDP. The reason is that since the 
economy can produce the same level of welfare (absorption) with less production, it does so. It imports 
more, exports less, and raises consumption, investment, and absorption, all with about the same level of 
GDP.  
   
                                                       
6 A rise in remittances has exactly the opposite effects.   
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Table 3.4—Effect of raising the price of food (percent change) 
      Base  Food Price +10%  Food Price +20%  Food Price +30% 
  
 
Percentage change per year from initial value    
Real  Absorption 
3.55  3.57  3.60  3.64 
   Consumption 
3.57  3.58  3.60  3.63 
   Investment 
3.20  3.26  3.33  3.40 
   Government cons. 
3.47  3.53  3.59  3.65 
   Exports 
5.62  5.56  5.50  5.42 
   Imports 
3.49  3.51  3.53  3.57 
   GDP at market prices 
4.14  4.15  4.15  4.16 
     
Percentage Change from Initial Value    
Prices  Real exchange rate 
6.10  6.10  6.10  6.10 
   Nominal exchange rate 
5.00  4.00  3.00  2.00 
   World export prices 
   1.40  2.90  4.30 
   World import prices 
   0.50  0.90  1.40 
   World price index 
   0.80  1.70  2.50 
   Domestic price index 
-1.00  -1.20  -1.40  -1.50 
   Terms of trade 
   1.00  1.90  2.90 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
A one-time rise in the price of oil, on the other hand, hurts everyone, as shown in Table 3.5. It 
forces a large real exchange devaluation and a decline in the rate of growth of both production and 
absorption. The rate of growth of consumption, investment, and government expenditures all fall. Since 
foreign saving is held constant in this experiment, exports have to rise and non-oil imports have to fall by 
enough to pay for the higher-priced oil. In the formal sector, where unskilled labor is assumed to have a 
fixed wage, unemployment rises relative to both the base run and to the initial amount. For the other 
factors, all of which are assumed to have flexible wages, wages or rates of return fall, with the negative 
impact particularly severe for land.  
Table 3.5—Effect of raising the price of oil (percent change) 









Percentage change per year from initial value    
Real  Absorption 
3.55  3.42  3.31  3.22 
   Consumption 
3.57  3.43  3.31  3.20 
   Investment 
3.20  3.16  3.12  3.11 
   Government cons. 
3.47  3.33  3.19  3.05 
   Exports 
5.62  5.76  5.87  5.97 
   Imports 
3.49  3.33  3.21  3.12 
   GDP at market prices 
4.14  4.10  4.07  4.03 
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Table 3.5—Continued 







   
Percentage change from initial value 
 
Prices  Real exchange rate 
6.10  9.00  11.80  14.50 
   Nominal exchange rate 
5.00  4.60  4.10  3.50 
   World export prices 
 
1.50  3.10  4.60 
   World import prices 
 
3.20  6.50  9.70 
   World price index 
 
2.60  5.20  7.90 
   Domestic price index 
-1.00  -1.50  -2.00  -2.50 
   Terms of trade 
   -1.60  -3.20  -4.60 
Source: Authors’ worksheets.  
It is worthwhile to think for a minute about how the Guatemalan economy adjusts to this 
unfavorable change in conditions. Partly it is done through a nominal devaluation and a rise in 
international prices. But that is not particularly helpful to exporters because Guatemala does not produce 
or export oil and because the devaluation increases their costs. That being the case, what causes exports to 
go up? The answer has to be found in factor costs. In Table 3.6 we show the wage rate in year 10 relative 
to the base run. In the formal sector the real wage of unskilled labor is fixed at the minimum wage. But 
wages for all other factors have to fall by enough to clear each factor market. As can be seen, the rental 
rate for land and the wages of informal-sector labor, both skilled and unskilled, decline. Skilled formal-
sector labor and capital suffer a much smaller impact. These declines in factor returns permit a reduction 
in the prices of almost all produced commodities except those most directly affected by the cost of fuel 
inputs, with the result that the relative price and profitability of exports goes up. It is worth emphasizing 
that this requires a substantial fall in the real wage of all the factors of production other than formal-sector 
unskilled labor—particularly those linked to agriculture. For formal-sector unskilled labor, loss of income 
happens not through falling wages but through rising unemployment, which increases by 30 percent 
relative to the base by year 10 of the simulation. In the simulation this all happens painlessly. But in the 
real world, these sorts of changes in factor returns are never painless or easy to achieve. A rise in the price 
of oil of the magnitude shown here could bring with it significant political costs and unrest.  
Table 3.6—Effect of an oil price shock on the growth of factor returns per year 
  Base  Oil +10%  Oil +20%  Oil +30%   
fcain  1.338  1.14  0.951  0.773    
fcafo  1.294  1.246  1.231  1.252    
fncin  1.309  1.084  0.861  0.642    
fncfo 
       
  
fcap  0.574  0.476  0.393  0.325    
flnd  4.748  4.466  4.173  3.868    
Source: Authors’ worksheets.  
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4.  THE REGIONAL MODEL AND SIMULATIONS 
There is a large variation across the regions of Guatemala in average levels of income, poverty, and 
economic structure. For development planning purposes it is useful to have a regionalized version of the 
national model that will reflect this heterogeneity. With a regional model we can simulate the impact of 
investment programs targeted to poor regions with unexploited economic potential, high levels of 
poverty, or both. Unfortunately we do not have sufficient information on regional trade flows to build a 
fully regionalized model where regional markets clear at different prices with differences between 
demand and supply satisfied by interregional trade flows. The regional model that we develop here is 
partial in two dimensions. First, our regionalization of production covers only the agricultural sectors, 
wherein land is a geographically fixed factor of production. Second, all markets, both agricultural and 
nonagricultural, are national. Production in all agricultural sectors is regional, but the commodities 
produced all flow into a national market, where one single commodity price clears the market. 
Households, household consumption, and household income are distinguished by region, but all 
purchases are made in national product markets.  
We have the same six factors of production that we had in the national model: skilled and 
unskilled labor in the formal and informal sectors, capital, and land, but in this case we have all categories 
of labor and land also disaggregated by region. Capital grows or shrinks over time in each sector in 
response to differences in relative productivity and the overall amount of capital formation in the 
economy. Each labor factor increases at an exogenous rate in each region. In that sense there is no 
permanent migration of labor between regions in the model. But since production outside of agriculture is 
not regionally defined, laborers who live in one region may in fact work in another region. Therefore even 
though there is a regional wage for each type of labor, each of these labor markets clears at a wage that 
will be very close to equal across regions, and we will treat income earned as if it came from the region of 
residence rather than the region where the production takes place. But what about formal-sector unskilled 
labor, for which we impose a fixed minimum wage? Here we have no market-clearing wage mechanism 
and therefore no way for unemployment rates to be equal across the country. As we will see, exogenous 
changes in conditions have different effects on unemployment and therefore on regional incomes across 
the country.  
The Regional Breakdown and Distribution of Arable Land between Crops 
For this exercise, we divided the country into four regions, North, Central, East, and West (shown in 
Figure 2.1). We then allocated the total amount of arable land across the sectors included in our CGE 
model using data from the fichas Ministry of Agriculture (2008). Table 4.1 shows the resulting distribution 
of land across crops and regions. Table 4.2 shows yields by crop, in both tons and US dollars
.7 
   
                                                       
7 All dollar amounts are in US dollars.  
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Table 4.1—Arable land by crop and region, in hectares 
Sector  West  North  East  Central  Total 
Traditional 
262,543  200,954  150,349  137,116  750,963 
Cereal 
146,560  353,837  40,895  34,279  575,571 
Beans 
68,765  115,538  36,084  14,691  235,079 
Potatoes 
150,177  14,442  10,825  14,691  190,136 
Vegetables 
107,269  28,885  12,028  144,462  292,644 
Fruit 
45,973  57,769  39,692  24,485  167,919 
Oilseeds 
64,362  0  1,203  2,449  68,013 
Flowers 
12,259  0  1,203  14,691  28,153 
Sugar 
15,324  0  1,203  73,455  89,982 
Other 
27,584  14,442  1,203  2,449  45,677 
Total 
900,817  787,106  294,685  462,768  2,445,376 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
What is particularly important to us in Table 4.2 is the striking differences in gross receipts per 
hectare for different crops. Fruits and vegetables have the highest gross receipts, followed by the 
traditional export crops of bananas, sugar, and coffee, as well as potatoes. The subsistence crops, maize 
and beans, generate less than one-tenth as much revenue per hectare. Even accounting for differences in 
the cost of production, it is almost certainly the case that fruits, vegetables, and the traditional export 
crops generate far more net income per hectare than maize and beans. Regional Distribution of Rural 
Poverty. 
Table 4.2—Yields and sales per hectare by selected crops 
   Yield per ha (tons)  Sales per ha 
Bananas 
42.2  $3,733.90 
Coffee 
1.0  $813.80 
Sugar 
86.0  $2,793.90 
Tomatoes 
34.9  $8,255.80 
Avocados 
10.2  $6,674.80 
Melons 
23.1  $4,178.40 
Maize 
2.3  $77.60 
Beans 
0.8  $181.70 
Potatoes 
25.8  $3,723.90 
Source: FAOSTAT. (2011). 
Notes: Data are for 2008, yield per hectare is in tons, and sales in dollars. 
What is particularly important to us in Table 4.2 is the striking differences in gross receipts per 
hectare for different crops. Fruits and vegetables have the highest gross receipts, followed by the 
traditional export crops of bananas, sugar, and coffee, as well as potatoes. The subsistence crops, maize 
and beans, generate less than one-tenth as much revenue per hectare. Even accounting for differences in 
the cost of production, it is almost certainly the case that fruits, vegetables, and the traditional export  
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crops generate far more net income per hectare than maize and beans. Regional Distribution of Rural 
Poverty 
One of the main purposes of this paper is to design regional policies that will reduce rural 
poverty. To do that, we need to get an estimate of where the rural poor are to be found. We have data by 
municipality for total poverty but no data that distinguish rural from urban poverty at the local level, since 
all local poverty estimates are based on economy wide poverty lines. Since we are especially interested in 
rural poverty, we made an approximation to reflect the higher incidence of poverty in the countryside. To 
do this, we used the rural and urban poverty rates at the national level for 2001/02 reported by ECLAC in 
its annual publication, Social Panorama of Latin America. According to ECLAC (2002) the poverty rates 
for the urban and rural sectors in Guatemala were 45.3 percent and 68.0 percent, respectively, in 2001/02. 
We used this relationship of 0.666 between urban and rural poverty to solve for the rural and urban 
poverty rates for each municipality, based on the observed overall poverty rate and the observed shares of 
urban and rural population in each municipality. The resulting rural and urban poverty rates for 2001/02 
should be regarded as nothing more than a good guess of the actual rates and used with caution while we 
wait for better and more up-to-date data.  
The Secretaría de Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia (SEGEPLAN) dataset and our 
adjustments for rural and urban poverty produced an estimate of the incidence of poverty in rural and 
urban populations at the district level based on data from the 2002 census and the Encuesta Nacional de 
Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI) survey in 2002. We aggregated these into our four regions of Guatemala, 
and they are displayed in Table 4.3. The incidence of poverty tells what proportion of the rural and urban 
population has a monthly income below the poverty line. It should be noted that since ECLAC used 
separate poverty lines for the rural and urban populations in calculating the proportion of the respective 
populations that were poor, in effect we are not using the national line of $546 per year but rather two 
separate lines whose weighted average would come out to that amount. According to the table, in 2002 
about 75 percent of the rural population, or 4.5 million people, were poor. That is to say, they had per 
capita incomes of less than, and in most cases far less than, $1.50 per day. Poverty incidence, as one 
would expect, is much less severe among the urban population, but even so some 1.6 million urban 
inhabitants were below the urban poverty line.
8 Of particular relevance to us here is the concentration of 
poverty in the rural population and in the four regions in the table. Of the 6 million poor people in the 
country, three-fourths were in the rural sector, two-thirds of them in the North and West.  











Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
   
                                                       
8 The ECLAC poverty lines of $84 per month in the urban sector and $56 in the rural are much higher than the $46 per 
month used by SEGEPLAN. This must be the main reason why the incidence of urban poverty in the ECLAC study is so much 
higher than the 30 percent rate implied in Table 4.3.  
   Individuals in poverty 
   Rural     Urban     Total 
North 
  868,304  171,301  1,039,605 
Central 
  477,591  493,782  971,373 
West 
2,317,514  681,540  2,999,054 
East 
  862,497  230,231  1,092,728 
Total 
 4,525,906  1,576,854  6,102,760  
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Looking back at the distribution of arable land by crop and region in Table 4.1, we see that in the 
two poorest regions of Guatemala, a lot of arable land is devoted to maize and beans, the two crops with 
the lowest sales per hectare. Very little or no land is devoted to fruits and vegetables, two of the highest-
yielding crops. Our simulations are going to show alternative ways of inducing a switch of land from low- 
to high-profit crops. Our regional CGE model allows us to simulate various ways to do this.  
Inducing a Switch to Higher-Profit Crops 
The North and the West between them have about 1.7 million hectares of arable land. One-third of that is 
currently being used to grow maize and another 10 percent is devoted to beans. Yet we know that the 
gross sales per hectare are at least 10 times higher in fruits and vegetables than they are in these two 
subsistence crops. We do not know exactly what holds farmers back from making the switch to fruits, 
vegetables, or flowers, but we are going to assume here that with sufficient investments in infrastructure 
and extension it would be possible to induce a significant shift in favor of these higher-yielding activities, 
all or most of which will be assumed to be grown for export—meaning, they are of export quality. To get 
some idea of the orders of magnitude involved, suppose that the farmers in the North and West are able to 
shift 100,000 hectares into fruits, vegetables, and flowers, and out of maize and beans. That implies a 
roughly 14 percent decline in the amount of land used for maize and beans in the North and West. We 
know the average yield per hectare of maize and beans is about $100 (FAOSTAT, 2011). In contrast, as 
we showed in Table 4.2, tomatoes generate $8,200 per hectare, avocadoes $6,700, and melons about 
$4,200. Let us assume that the switchover yields an increase in sales of $4,000 per hectare. Multiplied by 
100,000 hectares, this is an additional $400 million per year. The gross sales value of Guatemala’s 20 
largest crops (excluding animal products) was $2.1 billion. Thus this switch would increase the value of 
crop sales by about 20 percent. If the entire addition to sales were exported, it would raise exports by 
about 4.5 percent (their level in 2008 was $ 9.6 billion). 
What might it cost to induce such a switch? In 2008, gross capital formation was around 
$7 billion per year. If we use the same investment growth rate of 7 percent per year that was assumed 
earlier in the paper, investment doubles over 10 years. Suppose $4 billion of that, or $400 million per 
year, is devoted to the transformation of agriculture in the North and West. Over time, as the switch is 
made, if our estimates are accurate, then that additional investment will generate an additional $400 
million in sales. In our model, as we will see, that won’t happen right away because of the small size of 
these three exporting sectors in the North and West.  
To roughly capture the policy intervention we are discussing, we made four simulations, the 
results of which are shown in Table 4.4. First, we repeat the base run and a run with investment growing 
by 7 percent but without any investment-induced changes in the growth rate of productivity. This run is 
exactly the same one we did in the investment growth simulation discussed in the previous section. The 
second simulation uses the same overall growth rate of investment but assumes that it all goes to the 
North and West, where we suppose that the productivity of all crops rises by 10 percent rather than the 1 
percent assumed in the base run. The third simulation raises productivity in the North and West by 10 
percent, but only in the subsectors of fruits, vegetables, and flowers. In the final simulation we continue to 
invest in productivity increases in these three export sectors in the North and West, and in addition we 
give all exporters of these three sectors for all regions an export subsidy of 10 percent.  
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Table 4.4—Growth rates per year of macro variables in response to regional investment 
simulations  
  Initial  Base  Sim 1  Sim 2  Sim 3  Sim 4 
Absorption 
328.74  3.55  4.08  4.47  4.16  4.16 
Consumption 
256.49  3.57  3.75  4.26  3.85  3.84 
Investment 
49.99  3.20  7.00  7.00  7.00  7.00 
Stocks 
-4.56            
Government 
26.83  3.47  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Exports 
71.22  5.62  6.94  7.57  7.09  7.12 
Imports 
-124.97  3.49  4.39  4.83  4.50  4.52 
GDP at market prices 
274.99  4.14  4.75  5.19  4.84  4.83 
Real exchange rate 
100.00  6.10  8.80  7.60  8.90  8.60 
Source: Authors’ worksheets.  
Notes: Simulation 1 = raise growth rate of investment to 7 percent per year. Simulation 2 = simulation 1 + increase of 10 percent 
in the productivity of all agricultural sectors in North and West. Simulation 3 = simulation 1 + productivity increase in only 
fruits, vegetables, and flowers in North and West. Simulation 4 = simulation 3 + plus export subsidies to all producers of fruits, 
vegetables, and flowers in all regions. All growth rates are over a 10-year simulation except for the real exchange rate, which is 
the percent change relative to the base.  
As we have seen, raising the investment growth rate has a substantial effect on the overall growth 
rate of the economy, even if it does not increase the growth rate of productivity. Raising the investment 
share from 18 percent to 22 percent increases the growth rate of GDP by 0.6 percentage point. If the 
economy has more fixed capital it can grow significantly faster, even without considering any link 
between capital formation and productivity. This can be seen clearly in the comparison of any of the 
simulations with simulation 1, since each of the others represents a particular way of targeting investment 
so as to increase productivity. One can think of simulation 2 as regional targeting. Here we might assume 
that the additional investment improves the transportation network or provides electricity to underserved 
areas. If such regional productivity gains are achievable, the simulation shows how large an effect they 
could have on national production. GDP, consumption, and exports would all grow about 0.5 percentage 
point faster than in simulation 1, where the added investment is assumed to have no effect on 
productivity. If the productivity stimulus is limited to only the three export sectors in the North and West 
(simulation 3), the growth impetus is of course smaller. But even so, the growth rate of the economy rises 
by 0.7 percentage point per year relative to the base run and 0.1 percentage point relative to simulation 1.  
An interesting feature of Table 4.4 is the response of exports and the real exchange rate to these 
simulations. With no increase in productivity and with constant foreign saving, the real exchange rate has 
to depreciate by 8.8 percent in order to induce the growth in exports necessary to offset import growth. If 
the investment leads to an increase in productivity, as in simulation 2, the real depreciation is lower and 
the rate of growth of exports is higher.  
Finally, compare simulations 3 and 4. In the latter, we have brought export subsidies into the 
picture. Productivity increases are assumed in the three export sectors in the North and West, but the 
subsidies help exporters of those crops in all four regions. What we find is that while these subsidies do 
increase the growth rate of exports, they also lead to a slight reduction in the growth rate of GDP. That is 
because the subsidies induce a shift of land out of competing crops and into fruits, vegetables, and 
flowers. Exports do grow faster, but the opportunity cost of production forgone in the other agricultural 
sectors appears to completely offset the gains in these three sectors.  
We next consider the effects of these various simulations on the agricultural sectors in all regions 
of the country, as shown in Table 4.5. The simulations are the same as those described in Table 4.4. First, 
compare simulations 1 and 2, which show the very large kick obtained if investment increases  
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productivity in all sectors of the North and West. In fact, the response is so great from these two regions 
that there is some reduction in production in the Central and East. Our simulations may be too optimistic 
on the increases in productivity that are possible, but the message is clear that given enough time, if an 
effective regional investment strategy can be devised it will have a large and favorable impact on regional 
production in the two poorest regions in the country, doubling or more than doubling the growth rates of 
all crops, particularly the high-value crops of coffee, bananas, sugar, fruits, vegetables, and flowers.  
If the increases in productivity are confined to fruits, vegetables, and flowers, there is an even 
larger impact on the growth rate of these three sectors in the North and West. But since total land is fixed, 
this growth comes at the expense of the other crops, in particular beans, cereals (maize), potatoes, and the 
traditional export crops of coffee, bananas, and sugar. That did not happen in simulation 2 because those 
other sectors were assumed to have the same increase in productivity as the three nontraditional export 
sectors.  
Table 4.5—Growth over 10 years in value-added by agricultural sector 
Activity     North  South  East  West 
traditional exports  base  1.29  1.28  1.29  1.31 
traditional exports  sim1  1.32  1.31  1.33  1.35 
traditional exports  sim2  4.02  1.62  1.59  3.94 
traditional exports  sim3  1.23  1.33  1.32  1.23 
traditional exports  sim4  1.16  1.24  1.26  1.15 
Activity     North  South  East  West 
cereals  sim1  1.27  1.26  1.29  1.31 
cereals  sim2  2.24  0.81  0.78  2.12 
cereals  sim3  1.22  1.37  1.36  1.22 
cereals  sim4  1.20  1.32  1.36  1.19 
beans  base  1.31  1.31  1.33  1.33 
beans  sim1  1.30  1.29  1.31  1.32 
beans  sim2  2.40  0.89  0.86  2.31 
beans  sim3  1.26  1.35  1.35  1.26 
beans  sim4  1.25  1.32  1.35  1.24 
potatoes  base  1.26  1.26  1.29  1.31 
potatoes  sim1  1.23  1.22  1.26  1.28 
potatoes  sim2  1.96  0.70  0.67  1.86 
potatoes  sim3  1.21  1.35  1.36  1.23 
potatoes  sim4  1.21  1.31  1.37  1.21 
vegetable  base  1.34  1.33  1.35  1.25 
vegetable  sim1  1.34  1.33  1.35  1.21 
vegetable  sim2  3.13  1.20  1.18  2.80 
vegetable  sim3  3.53  1.15  1.15  3.41 
vegetable  sim4  3.83  1.25  1.29  3.82 
fruits  base  1.19  1.19  1.21  1.22 
fruits  sim1  1.16  1.15  1.17  1.19 
fruits  sim2  3.16  1.13  1.10  3.04 
fruits  sim3  3.92  1.11  1.10  3.91 
fruits  sim4  4.57  1.24  1.28  4.51 
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Table 4.5—Continued 
Activity     North  South  East  West 
flowers  base  1.21  1.21  1.23  1.23 
flowers  sim1  1.19  1.18  1.20  1.21 
flowers  sim2  4.66  1.66  1.64  4.53 
flowers  sim3  5.61  1.72  1.72  5.60 
flowers  sim4  6.96  2.07  2.11  6.90 
sugar  base  1.44  1.43  1.45  1.45 
sugar  sim1  1.49  1.48  1.50  1.51 
sugar  sim2  3.49  1.27  1.27  3.42 
sugar  sim3  1.45  1.50  1.51  1.44 
sugar  sim4  1.46  1.50  1.53  1.45 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
Notes: Simulation 1 = Raise growth rate of investment to 7 percent per year. Simulation 2 = simulation 1 + increase of 10 percent 
in the productivity of all agricultural sectors in North and West. Simulation 3 = simulation 1 + productivity increase in only 
fruits, vegetables, and flowers in North and West. Simulation 4 = simulation 3 + plus export subsidies to all producers of fruits, 
vegetables, and flowers in all regions. All growth rates are over a 10-year simulation except for the real exchange rate, which is 
the percent change relative to the base.  
Table 4.6 shows the impact these four simulations on agricultural exports from the main 
exporting sectors. To get a better understanding of relative size, the numbers in the table are the absolute 
changes in each export commodity over the 10 years. Not surprisingly, in the base run, even after 10 years 
the traditional export commodities, bananas and coffee, contribute half the increase in export value. Of 
particular interest to us here is the impact of productivity increases in just fruits, flowers, and vegetables 
compared with an across-the-board improvement in regional productivity in the North and West. To see 
that, compare simulation 2 with simulation 1 or 3. In simulation 1, all we have is an increase in capital. 
There is no change in the growth rate of productivity. There is a small net effect on traditional exports but 
none in the other three commodities. However, an across-the-board increase in regional productivity 
(simulation 2) is a different story. It has a powerful effect on all the commodities, but particularly the 
traditional exports, whose growth in absolute terms dominates the other three. That, of course, is because 
these exports were so much larger than the other three to start with. What that says is that investments in 
across-the-board improvements in regional productivity are likely to have their biggest impact on the 
traditional crops, at least in the short run. That will give a quick boost to exports, quicker than an 
investment strategy targeted just to fruits, vegetables, and flowers. One can see that in simulation 3. The 
growth of traditional exports in this scenario actually falls below that of the base run as land is switched 
over to the favored sectors. Whereas three-fourths of total export growth in this group came from bananas 
and coffee in simulation 2, in simulation 3 even though the total increase in exports is cut in half, three-
fourths of that growth comes from the nontraditional crops.  
Table 4.6—Change in agricultural exports by sector 
  Traditional  Fruit  Vegetables  Flowers 
base  2.09  0.07  1.40  0.50 
sim1  2.42  0.02  1.39  0.49 
sim2  11.74  0.87  2.62  1.12 
sim3  2.02  1.29  3.09  1.31 
sim4  1.41  1.87  3.73  1.64 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
Next we consider the effects of these four different development interventions on factor returns. 
Table 4.7 shows the returns for all factors in year 10 relative to the base year. Except for unskilled labor 
in the formal sector, whose wage is assumed to be fixed in real terms at the starting minimum wage, the 
other three factors all have significant increases of roughly 18 percent over 10 years, or 1.7 percent per  
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year. For formal-sector unskilled labor, the gain will be in employment rather than wages, as we will see 
further on.  
Table 4.7—Real wages in year 10 relative to base year  
 
Base  Sim1  Sim2  Sim3  Sim 4 
fcain-n  1.182  1.331  1.403  1.350  1.346 
fcain-s  1.184  1.330  1.385  1.347  1.344 
fcain-e  1.181  1.329  1.392  1.346  1.341 
fcain-w  1.183  1.330  1.403  1.350  1.346 
fcafo-n  1.175  1.130  1.170  1.143  1.140 
fcafo-s  1.175  1.128  1.165  1.140  1.137 
fcafo-e  1.174  1.128  1.165  1.140  1.137 
fcafo-w  1.176  1.138  1.179  1.151  1.148 
fncin-n  1.175  1.350  1.432  1.381  1.384 
fncn-s  1.185  1.359  1.384  1.370  1.380 
fncn-e  1.172  1.343  1.374  1.356  1.361 
fncn-w  1.179  1.353  1.458  1.391  1.399 
fncfo-n  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
fncfo-s  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
fncfo-e  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
fncfo-w  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
fcap  0.999  0.950  1.001  0.961  0.960 
fland-n  1.560  1.636  2.474  1.804  1.885 
fland-s  1.559  1.652  1.534  1.586  1.709 
fland-e  1.528  1.616  1.599  1.608  1.654 
fland-w  1.505  1.579  2.595  1.799  1.903 
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
We have assumed that there is a one national market for capital. Therefore the rate of return, 
whatever it is, will be the same across regions; in other words, there need be only one row in the table. 
But in addition, we see that if we increase the supply of capital without affecting productivity, the rate of 
return falls. If we confine the productivity increase to only the nontraditional exports, we also reduce the 
profit rate relative to its initial level. It is only when we have a regional investment strategy that succeeds 
in increasing the productivity of all sectors in the North and West that the profit rate recovers its initial 
value. Because land is a regionally fixed factor growing at an exogenously fixed rate of 1 percent per 
year, the model predicts that even in the base run, the rate of return will rise by a bit more than 50 percent 
over 10 years. That gain rises to around 60 percent if the country manages to increase its growth rate by 
increasing the rate of growth of capital formation as in simulation 1. If the country targets its investment 
to the North and West, as in simulation 2, rents in the North and West jump by 2.5 times rather than 1.5 
times as in the base run. Rents in the other two regions both fall relative to their levels in simulation 1, 
and they even fall relative to the base run in the Central region. In the North and West there is also a 
significant gain in simulation 3, in which all of the additional investment goes into the three 
nontraditional export sectors, although the absolute gain is smaller, since traditional exporting sectors do 
not enjoy the assumed productivity gain. When we add an export subsidy to the policy mix, as in 
simulation 4, rents rise in all regions, particularly in the Central region, where a good deal of the 
traditional export crops are grown.  
Another place where we can see the effects of regionally targeted investment is in the labor share. 
Just as land in the North and West gains from productivity gains induced by regional or sectoral 
investment, so does labor. Not surprisingly, the most powerful push comes from the across-the-board 
regional productivity growth in simulation 2. All labor groups gain in all regions, but the gain is 
particularly pronounced for labor in the informal sector. There, both skilled and unskilled labor have their 
wages rising by 40–45 percent over 10 years, compared with around 33 percent in simulation 1 or 18 
percent in the base run. Note also that for unskilled labor in the formal sector, the gains come in 
employment (not shown in the table) rather than in wages, which are assumed constant in real terms. In  
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the North and West, employment growth in simulation 2 is around 27 percent over 10 years, compared 
with around 17 percent in the base run. But it is also clear from Table 4.7 that the workers in the other two 
regions gain almost as much as the workers in the North and West because they also gain from increases 
to capital even though their productivity does not increase. So one could draw a more optimistic message 
from these simulations, and that is that everyone gains from increases in investment. If these increases are 
regionally targeted, then the less-favored regions close the income gap slightly as well.  
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this study we present a new dynamic regionalized CGE model that we have developed for Guatemala. 
In its national version the model is a useful tool for analyzing the impact of and the policy response to 
various macroeconomic shocks. In the paper we used the model to find the effects on the economy of 
rising oil and food prices and changes in the inflow of remittances. We also simulated how the growth 
rate of the economy is affected by variations in the rate of growth of investment. In the base run, the 
economy grows at 4.1 percent per year and invests about 18 percent of GDP, one of the lowest shares of 
investment in the region. If the investment growth rate rises to 5 percent per year, the GDP growth rate 
rises to 4.4 percent and the investment share rises to 19 percent. If investment grows by 7 percent per 
year, the growth rate of GDP rises to 4.75 percent and the investment share rises to 22 percent by year 10. 
In other words, the economy gets about 0.6 percentage points of additional growth by devoting an 
additional 4 percent to investment. In the short run, this additional capital formation reduces the growth 
rate of consumption, but over time both consumption and its rate of growth are higher than in the slow-
growth base-run alternative.  
By contrast with simpler models, the CGE allows one to see just how the economy responds to 
exogenous shocks. One of our simulations varies the inflow of remittances from -10 percent to +20 
percent. We show that while the rate of growth of the economy is not overly affected by the shock, labor 
incomes and the composition of output are. When there is a contraction of remittances, there is a 
significant real depreciation of the exchange rate. Consumption, investment, and absorption all fall as the 
economy shifts production away from nontradables and toward exports and import substitutes. The model 
shows quite clearly that because of Guatemala’s dependence on imported intermediate inputs, particularly 
of oil and machinery, it takes quite a large change in the real exchange rate to offset even fairly small 
fluctuations in remittances.  
The same result is seen when there is a negative oil price shock. Since foreign saving is constant, 
exports have to rise and imports have to decline relative to the base run. It takes a large real devaluation 
and significant reductions in real wages and employment growth to make that happen, changes that are 
difficult to achieve in an open political system.  
We regionalized the CGE model so that it would be a useful tool for analyzing regional 
development strategies. Because of our interest in rural poverty reduction and because of regional data 
limitations, we limited the regional detail to agricultural activities. But that allowed us to simulate various 
investment strategies targeted to the North and West, the two poorest regions of the country. In our first 
simulation we set the investment growth rate at 7 percent per year and assumed that enough of it was 
targeted to the North and West to raise productivity in all agricultural sectors by 10 percent. That in itself 
raises the growth rate of GDP a full percentage point relative to the base run. Exports rise by 2 percentage 
points, much of which comes from rising exports of bananas and sugar from the North and West. Labor in 
every region gains in this simulation, particularly in the informal sector, where wages rise by 40–45 
percent over 10 years, compared with 18 percent in the base run. Everyone gains from an increase in 
investment, even if it is focused on just the poorest regions of the country, provided it produces an 
increase in productivity. If productivity improvement is limited to just the nontraditional exports in the 
North and West, the overall gains in growth, consumption, and wages are of course smaller, but they are 
still considerable. 
The regional simulations that we report here are nothing more than a first approximation because 
we do not know how much it would cost to make the productivity improvements we have assumed. What 
the simulations make clear, however, is the large impact that can be expected from productivity 
improvements. An important area for future research is to fill in the gap in our knowledge of what it 
might cost to make such improvements. The simulations show how important it is to improve our 
knowledge in this area and to introduce that additional knowledge into the model.   
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 






   
Source: Authors’ worksheets.  
Note: The first 12 activities (a-chrad – a-mveg) are also disaggregated by region. For instance, there is one activity cereal North, 
one activity cereal Central, one activity cereal East, and one activity cereal West; they are all combined into one commodity 
cereal. 
  a-spostal  c-spostal  Servicios de intermediación financiera y seguros 
  a-sinm  c-sinm  Real state services 
  a-salquil  c-salquil  Rental services 
  a-gov  c-gov  Public administration and other services to the 
comm nit  at large    a-sense  c-sense  Education services 
  a-ssalud  c-ssalud  Human health services 
  a-svet  c-svet  Veterinary services 
  a-ssoc  c-ssoc  Social services 
  a-salcan  c-salcan  Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation 
  a-oserv  c-oserv  Other social and personal services 
  a-sdom  c-sdom  Domestic services 
       
       
Factors  fcain-n    Labor-skilled-informal-north 
  fcain-s    Labor-skilled-informal-south 
  fcain-e    Labor-skilled-informal-east 
  fcain-w    Labor-skilled-informal-west 
  fcafo-n    Labor-skilled-formal-north 
  fcafo-s    Labor-skilled-formal-south 
  fcafo-e    Labor-unskilled-formal-east 
  fcafo-w    Labor-unskilled-formal-west 
  fncin-n    Labor-unskilled-informal-north 
  fncin-s    Labor-unskilled-informal-south 
  fncin-e    Labor-unskilled-informal-east 
  fncin-w    Labor-unskilled-informal-west 
  fncfo-n    Labor-unskilled-formal-north 
  fncfo-s    Labor-unskilled-formal-south 
  fncfo-e    Labor-unskilled-formal-east 
  fncfo-w    Labor-unskilled-formal-west 
  flnd-n    Land-north 
  flnd-s    Land-central 
  flnd-e    Land-east 
  flnd-w    Land-west 
  cap    Capital 
Households  hhd-n    Households north 
  hhd-s    Households central 
  hhd-e    Households east 
  hhd-w    Households west 
Government  gov     Government 
Taxes  t-exp    Export taxes 
  t-vat    Sales taxes 
  t-imp    Import tariffs 
  t-com    Commodity taxes 
  t-dir    Direct taxes 
  t-sub    Subsidies 
  t-atax    activity tax 
Change in Stocks  dstk    Change in stocks 
Savings & investment  s-i    Savings and investment 
Rest of world  row    Rest of world 
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Table A.2—Changes in output, exports, and imports by sector in response to changes in remittances, percent change per year 
   Output              Exports             
   INITIAL  base  oil +10%      oil +20%      oil +30%      INITIAL  base  oil +10%  oil +20%  oil +30% 
c-ctrad  1.976  3.683  3.648  3.63  3.63  7.074  1.5  1.617  1.704  1.758 
c-cere  7.394  3.984  3.925  3.879  3.848  0.075  0.777  0.779  0.76  0.719 
c-legu  2.907  3.796  3.741  3.7  3.676  0.002  13.522  13.851  13.939  13.765 
c-ratu  1.928  3.451  3.402  3.368  3.353  0.037  -0.071  -0.088  -0.11  -0.139 
c-verd  3.1  3.945  3.893  3.855  3.833  1.091  1.582  1.542  1.489  1.422 
c-frut  2.303  3.642  3.588  3.548  3.523  0.38  3.833  3.921  3.928  3.844 
c-semi  1.097  4.887  4.824  4.763  4.705  0.141  3.202  3.166  3.104  3.015 
c-flor  0.25  3.446  3.407  3.373  3.344  0.416  3.007  2.948  2.866  2.758 
c-espe  0.108  4.157  4.134  4.122  4.123  0.007  5.317  5.343  5.303  5.191 
c-taba  0.171  5.068  5.004  4.938  4.87  0.243  0.218  0.17  0.087  -0.034 
c-azuc  2.365  4.94  4.876  4.812  4.746    
        c-mveg  0.358  6.501  6.25  5.929  5.535    
        c-anim  7.015  5.078  5.023  4.969  4.919  0.008  8.888  8.946  8.966  8.944 
c-oanim  3.08  5.22  5.174  5.135  5.104  0.017  8.978  9.046  9.06  9.012 
c-silvi  2.776  4.93  4.873  4.828  4.795  0.671  9.127  9.241  9.304  9.31 
c-pesc  0.596  4.957  4.911  4.877  4.857  0.207  7.479  7.519  7.532  7.513 
c-petr  0.015  14.878  18.169  21.007  23.543  2.547  6.013  5.95  5.873  5.781 
c-aren  1.698      4.8  4.652  4.509  4.373  0.019  11.532  11.915  12.211  12.406 
c-omin  0.741  4.913  4.892  4.882  4.886  1.877  6.135  6.118  6.092  6.056 
c-pcarn  10.847  4.591  4.522  4.465  4.421  0.16  8.646  8.595  8.442  8.174 
c-ppesc  0.513  4.196  4.133  4.091  4.07  0.111  7.342  7.302  7.197  7.02 
c-plegu  1.613  4.327  4.262  4.212  4.18  0.555  6.654  6.602  6.504  6.352 
c-aceite  4.132  4.63  4.616  4.619  4.642  1.804  6.389  6.334  6.238  6.096 
c-molin  9.707  4.763  4.694  4.633  4.583  0.441  6.838  6.77  6.649  6.468 
c-prepan  1.779  5.076  5.032  4.991  4.953  0.144  6.906  6.851  6.741  6.57 
c-panad  15.029  4.645  4.578  4.521  4.478  0.34  7.684  7.642  7.526  7.329 
c-pazuc  3.461  4.798  4.732  4.674  4.628  2.387  6.748  6.702  6.606  6.453 
c-pasta  0.998  4.625  4.558  4.502  4.46  0.089  7.45  7.406  7.294  7.107 
c-lacte  4.935  4.608  4.542  4.488  4.45  0.048  8.187  8.15  8.023  7.797 
c-opalim  6.044  4.509  4.455  4.416    4.395     1.172    6.766      6.714   6.612      6.454 
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Table A.2—Continued 
   Output              Exports             
   INITIAL  base  oil +10%      oil +20%      oil +30%      INITIAL  base  oil +10%  oil +20%  oil +30% 
c-ptaba  0.509  4.882  4.816  4.762  4.722  0.054  6.748  6.716  6.643  6.524 
c-textil  18.11  5.367  5.209  5.033  4.839  9.492  7.793  7.463  7.012  6.431 
c-cuero  3.699  4.743  4.634  4.53  4.434  0.243  8.298  8.067  7.722  7.252 
c-made  2.326  4.773  4.679  4.582  4.483  0.394  7.633  7.495  7.308  7.066 
c-papel  7.086  4.984  4.947  4.916  4.89  1.29  7.334  7.193  7.007  6.769 
c-quimi  41.832  4.923  4.729  4.601  4.53  7.098  6.12  8.552  10.724  12.711 
c-caucho  7.171  4.828  4.827  4.838  4.862  1.443  7.189  6.334  5.412  4.416 
c-onomet  7.284  4.727  4.668  4.62  4.586  0.718  8.221  7.161  6.041  4.859 
c-metale  6.715  5.118  5.011  4.892  4.761  1.583  6.379  6.185  5.943  5.647 
c-pmetal  33.175  4.351  4.314  4.292  4.288  2.449  6.56  6.357  6.102  5.791 
c-mueble  3.689  4.204  4.133  4.077  4.041  0.274  7.634  7.312  6.921  6.453 
c-oprod  3.913  4.671  4.589  4.514  4.449  0.608  7.485  7.242  6.929  6.539 
c-eleagu  8.432  5.12  5.039  4.96  4.881  0.099  11.503  10.731  9.89  8.973 
c-const  38.566  4.19  4.159  4.142  4.141  0.279  6.493  6.442  6.325  6.136 
c-comer  80.208  4.883  4.849  4.821  4.801  5.985  8.078  8.172  8.195  8.139 
c-aloja  18.153  4.508  4.439  4.379  4.328    
        c-sposta  21.441  5.194  5.121  5.053  4.994  0.731  7.57  7.476  7.348  7.181 
c-sinter  13.472  5.095  5.064  5.038  5.019  0.077  6.686  6.699  6.69  6.655 
c-sinm  30.977  5.663  5.647  5.636  5.629    
        c-salqui  23.886  5.034  5.009  4.99  4.978  4.57  8.005  8.058  8.096  8.114 
c-sense  10.553  3.852  3.749  3.641  3.525    
        c-ssalud  11.682  3.851  3.715  3.575  3.432    
        c-svet  0.201  5.149  5.104  5.06  5.016    
        c-ssoc  0.254  4.28  4.191  4.106  4.027    
        c-salcan  0.053  4.279  4.199  4.122  4.05    
        c-oserv  3.807  4.368  4.323  4.284  4.254  0.006  4.819  4.716  4.568  4.371 
c-sdom  2.996  4.251  4.172  4.097  4.027    
        c-gov  22.415  4.032  3.903  3.772  3.639                 
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Table A.2─Continued  
   Imports             
   INITIAL  Base  Oil +10%  Oil +20%  Oil +30% 
c-ctrad  0.012  6.558  6.399  6.287  6.227 
c-cere  3.319  5.183  5.113  5.062  5.031 
c-legu  0.093  4.92  4.859  4.826  4.825 
c-ratu  0.017  5.28  5.215  5.176  5.167 
c-verd  0.029  4.895  4.838  4.807  4.804 
c-frut  0.419  5.254  5.185  5.144  5.135 
c-semi  0.186  6.163  6.093  6.035  5.994 
c-flor  0.141  3.597  3.564  3.544  3.536 
c-espe  0.039  4.535  4.524  4.533  4.564 
c-taba  0.067  7.151  7.083  7.025  6.978 
c-azuc    
     
  
c-mveg  0.348  6.547  6.293  5.969  5.57 
c-anim  0.081  2.616  2.492  2.391  2.316 
c-oanim  0.018  3.166  3.064  2.997  2.971 
c-silvi  0.099  3.998  3.898  3.808  3.731 
c-pesc  0.057  4.053  3.979  3.927  3.899 
c-petr    
     
  
c-aren  0.17  -0.185  -0.716  -1.176  -1.551 
c-omin  0.603  4.807  4.786  4.778  4.786 
c-pcarn  0.766  2.541  2.487  2.505  2.605 
c-ppesc  0.243  3.46  3.401  3.382  3.409 
c-plegu  0.769  3.701  3.637  3.605  3.611 
c-aceite  2.864  4.368  4.364  4.385  4.436 
c-molin  0.759  3.469  3.408  3.396  3.44 
c-prepan  0.305  4.309  4.284  4.289  4.327 
c-panad  0.547  3.338  3.281  3.276  3.327 
c-pazuc  0.004  3.605  3.538  3.519  3.557 
c-pasta  0.066  3.373  3.314  3.306  3.353 
c-lacte  1.093  3.432  3.374  3.366  3.415 
c-opalim  2.304  3.835  3.788  3.777  3.806 
c-bebal  0.404  3.976  3.912  3.878  3.876 
c-bebnal  0.347  3.871  3.807  3.773  3.774 
c-ptaba  0.085  4.479  4.415  4.379  4.373 
c-textil  8.872  4.825  4.73  4.644  4.57 
c-cuero  1.054  4.044  4.017  4.028  4.082 
c-made  0.4  3.311  3.254  3.217  3.203 
c-papel  4.526  4.567  4.557  4.559  4.577 
c-quimi  38.298  4.895  4.621  4.418  4.278 
c-caucho  4.014  4.362  4.591  4.846  5.13 
c-onomet  1.387  3.232  3.761  4.333  4.952 
c-metale  6.054  5.082  4.98  4.868  4.745 
c-pmetal  28.835  4.242  4.217  4.212  4.228 
c-mueble  0.584  2.382  2.481  2.643  2.875 
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Table A.2─Continued  
   Imports             
   INITIAL  Base  Oil +10%  Oil +20%  Oil +30% 
c-oprod  2.22  4.282  4.249  4.236  4.246 
c-eleagu    
     
  
c-const  0.075  1.944  1.933  2.011  2.19 
c-comer  2.559  1.955  1.806  1.733  1.744 
c-aloja    
     
  
c-sposta  0.233  2.919  2.863  2.853  2.896 
c-sinter  1.38  3.811  3.744  3.705  3.698 
c-sinm    
     
  
c-salqui  2.458  2.654  2.568  2.504  2.468 
c-sense    
     
  
c-ssalud    
     
  
c-svet    
     
  
c-ssoc    
     
  
c-salcan    
     
  
c-oserv  0.082  3.938  3.947  4.013  4.142 
c-sdom    
     
  
c-gov                
Source: Author’s worksheets.    
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